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Abstract
Many systems of structured argumentation explicitly require that the facts and rules that make up
the argument for a conclusion be the minimal set required to derive the conclusion. aspic` does not
place such a requirement on arguments, instead requiring that every rule and fact that are part of an
argument be used in its construction. Thus aspic` arguments are minimal in the sense that removing
any element of the argument would lead to a structure that is not an argument. In this brief note
we discuss these two types of minimality and show how the first kind of minimality can, if desired, be
recovered in aspic`.
1 Introduction
A large part of the work on computational argumentation is concerned with structured, or logic-based argu-
mentation. In this work, much of the focus is on the way that arguments are constructed from some set of
components, expressed in some logic. At this point, perhaps the most widely studied system of structured
argumentation is aspic`, which builds on what is now quite a lengthy tradition, a tradition which goes
back at least as far as [10]. In addition to Pollock’s work on oscar [9, 11], we can count the work of Loui
[7], Krause et al. [6], Prakken and Sartor [13], Besnard and Hunter [2], Amgoud and Cayrol [1], Garc´ıa
and Simari [5] and Dung et al. [4] as being in the same lineage. aspic` [8, 12] is more recent, but very
influential, providing a very general notion of argumentation that captures many of the structured systems
which predate it. In all these systems, there is, often explicitly, a notion of an argument as a pair xc, ∆y
which relates the conclusion of the argument, c, and the set of statements ∆ from which that conclusion
is derived. The form of derivation, and what these “statements” consist of, are two of the aspects of these
systems which vary widely.
One difference between aspic` and other systems of structured argumentation is that many of the latter
require that arguments be minimal in the sense that the set ∆ in any argument xc, ∆y has to be minimal.
That is, ∆ has to be the smallest set from which c can be derived. We can find this explicitly expressed, for
example, in [1, 2, 5]. In contrast, like the assumption-based system from [4], aspic` does not explicitly require
arguments to be minimal in this sense. Instead aspic` arguments satisfy a different form of minimality in
which arguments cannot include premises or rules that are not used in the derivation of their conclusion. In
recent work using aspic`[3], we discovered some cases in which the difference between these two forms of
minimality was important, and so needed to investigate those differences in the context of aspic`. In this
note we report our findings.
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Note that while the first form of minimality is stronger than the native minimality of aspic`, because
there are aspic` arguments that are not minimal in this sense, this form of minimality is completely com-
patible with aspic`, and indeed with assumption-based argumentation (which shares the same mechanism
for defining an argument). As we show, when the stronger form of minimality is required, we can simply
invoke a definition for arguments in aspic` which does require this form of minimality.
2 Background
aspic
` is deliberately defined in a rather abstract way, as a system with a minimal set of features that can
capture the notion of argumentation. This is done with the intention that it can be instantiated by a number
of concrete systems that then inherit all of the properties of the more abstract system. aspic` starts from
a logical language L with a notion of negation. A given instantiation will then be equipped with inference
rules, and aspic` distinguishes two kinds of inference rules: strict rules and defeasible rules. Strict rules,
denoted usingÑ, are rules whose conclusions hold without exception. Defeasible rules, denoted ñ, are rules
whose conclusions hold unless there is an exception.
The language and the set of rules are used to define an argumentation system:
Definition 1 (Argumentation System) An argumentation system is a tuple AS “ xL, ,R, ny where:
• L is a logical language.
• is a function from L to 2L , such that:
– ϕ is a contrary of ψ if ϕ P ψ, ψ R ϕ;
– ϕ is a contradictory of ψ if ϕ P ψ, ψ P ϕ;
– each ϕ P L has at least one contradictory.
• R “ RsYRd is a set of strict (Rs) and defeasible (Rd) inference rules of the form φ1, . . . , φn Ñ φ and
φ1, . . . , φn ñ φ respectively (where φi, φ are meta-variables ranging over wff in L), and RsXRd “ H.
• n : Rd ÞÑ L is a naming convention for defeasible rules.
The function generalizes the usual symmetric notion of negation to allow non-symmetric conflict between
elements of L. The contradictory of some ϕ P L is close to the usual notion of negation, and we denote that
ϕ is a contradictory of ψ by “ϕ “  ψ”. The naming convention for defeasible rules is necessary because
aspic
` allows for rules that deny the applicability of other rules. Giving rules names makes this easy to
accomplish.
An argumentation system, as defined above, is just a language and some rules which can be applied
to formulae in that language. To provide a framework in which reasoning can happen, we need to add
information that is known, or believed, to be true. In aspic` this information makes up a knowledge base:
Definition 2 (Knowledge Base) A knowledge base in an argumentation system xL, ,R, ny is a set K Ď L
consisting of two disjoint subsets Kn and Kp.
We call Kn the axioms and Kp the ordinary premises. We make this distinction between the elements of
the knowledge base for the same reason that we make the distinction between strict and defeasible rules.
We are distinguishing between those elements — axioms and strict rules — which are definitely true and
allow truth-preserving inferences to be made, and those elements — ordinary premises and defeasible rules
— which can be disputed.
Combining the notions of argumentation system and knowledge base gives us the notion of an argumen-
tation theory:
Definition 3 (Argumentation Theory) An argumentation theory AT is a pair xAS,Ky of an argumen-
tation system AS and a knowledge base K.
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We are now nearly ready to define an argument. But first we need to introduce some notions which can be
defined just understanding that an argument is made up of some subset of the knowledge base K, along with
a sequence of rules, that lead to a conclusion. Given this, Premp¨q returns all the premises, Concp¨q returns
the conclusion and TopRulep¨q returns the last rule in the argument. Subp¨q returns all the sub-arguments
of a given argument, that is all the arguments that are contained in the given argument.
Definition 4 (Argument) An argument A from an argumentation theory AT “ xL, , Rules, ny,Ky is:
1. φ if φ P K with: PrempAq “ tφu; ConcpAq “ tφu; SubpAq “ tAu; TopRulepAq “ undefined.
2. A1, . . . , An Ñ φ if Ai, 1 ď i ď n, are arguments and there exists a strict rule of the form
ConcpA1q, . . . , ConcpAnq Ñ φ in Rs. PrempAq “ PrempA1q Y . . .Y PrempAnq; ConcpAq “ φ; SubpAq “
SubpA1q Y . . .Y SubpAnq Y tAu; TopRulepAq “ ConcpA1q, . . . , ConcpAnq Ñ φ.
3. A1, . . . , An ñ φ if Ai, 1 ď i ď n, are arguments and there exists a defeasible rule of the form
ConcpA1q, . . . , ConcpAnq ñ φ in Rd. PrempAq “ PrempA1qY . . .YPrempAnq; ConcpAq “ φ; SubpAq “
SubpA1q Y . . .Y SubpAnq Y tAu; TopRulepAq “ ConcpA1q, . . . , ConcpAnq ñ φ.
We write ApAT q to denote the set of arguments from the theory AT .
In other words, an argument is either an element of K, or it is made up of a rule and its conclusion where
each premise of the rule is the conclusion of a sub-argument. From here on, we will use the symbol ù when
we do not care about distinguishing whether an argument uses a strict rule Ñ or a defeasible rule ñ. Thus,
if we are making a statement about an argument A “ rB ù as, then we are making a statement about both
arguments A 1 “ rBÑ as and A2 “ rBñ as. Similarly, when referring to a rule a ù b we are referring to
either a strict rule aÑ b or a defeasible rule añ b, and in a context in which it does not matter whether
the rule is strict or defeasible.
The above is a standard presentation of an argument in aspic`. In this report we wish to refer to an
additional element of an argument, and to describe an argument in somewhat different way. In particular,
we wish to refer to RulespAq, which identifies all the strict or defeasible rules used in the argument A.
Definition 5 (Argument Rules) Let AT “ xAS,Ky be an argumentation theory and A P ApAT q. We
define the set of rules of A as follows:
RulespAq “
$’&
’%
H A P K
tTopRulepAqu Y
Ťn
i“1 RulespAiq A “ A1, . . . , An ù ConcpAq
We can then describe an argument A as a triple:
pG,R, pq
where G “ PrempAq are the grounds on which A is based, R “ RulespAq is the set of rules that are used to
construct A from G, and p “ ConcpAq is the conclusion of A.
Example 1 Consider that we have an argumentation system AS1 “ xL1, ,R1, ny, where L1 “ tp, q, r, s, t, u,
v, p, q, r, s, t, u, vu, R1 “ tp, q ù r; t, u ù r; r ù s;u ù vu. By adding the knowledge base
K1 “ tp, q, t, uu we obtain the argumentation theory AT1 “ xAS1,K1y, from which we can construct the
following arguments:
A1 “ rps; A2 “ rqs; A3 “ rA1, A2 ù rs; A “ rA3 ù ss;
B1 “ rts; B2 “ rus; B3 “ rB1, B2 ù rs; B “ rB3 ù ss
such that A1 “ ptpu,H, pq, A2 “ ptqu,H, qq, A3 “ ptp, qu, tp, q ù ru, rq, A “ ptp, qu, tp, q ù r;
r ù su, sq, B1 “ pttu,H, tq, B2 “ ptuu,H, uq, B3 “ ptt, uu, tt, u ù ru, rq and B “ ptt, uu, tt, u ù r;
r ù su, sq.
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3 Minimality
Now, as mentioned above, unlike some definitions of arguments in the literature—for example [1, 5]—
Definition 4 does not mention the minimality of the grounds or the set of rules. This does not mean that
aspic
` arguments are not, in some sense, minimal, as we we will now show.
The following example illustrates the fact that any element (proposition or rule) in the grounds and rules
of an argument needs to be used in the derivation of the conclusion of that argument:
Example 2 Given the argumentation theory from Example 1, the structure
C “ ptp, q, t, uu, tp, q ù r; t, u ù r; r ù su, sq
is not an argument. In particular, C is not an argument because the third clause of Definition 4 only justifies
adding the rules and grounds of one argument for each premise of the rule that is the subject of the clause.
Thus, it allows p, q ù r to be added to an argument with conclusion r, or it allows t, u ù r to be added,
but it does not permit both to be added. Similarly,
D “ ptp, qu, tp, q ù r; r ù s;u ù vu, sq
E “ ptt, uu, tt, u ù r; r ù s;u ù vu, sq
are not arguments because Definition 4 does not allow rules that are not used in the derivation of the
conclusion of an argument to be part of the set of rules of that argument. Finally, neither of
F “ ptp, q, t, uu, tp, q ù r; r ù su, sq
G “ ptp, q, t, uu, tt, u ù r; r ù su, sq
are arguments, because Definition 4 does not allow the addition of propositions to the grounds of an argument
if they do not correspond to premises of a rule in the argument.
Thus, as the preceding example shows, an argument A “ pG,R, pq cannot contain any elements in G or
R that are not used in the derivation of p, and so Definition 4 implies that arguments are minimal in the
sense that they do not contain any extraneous propositions or rules. This intuition is also pointed out by
the authors in [8], and we formalize it in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Let AT “ xAS,Ky be an argumentation theory and A P ApATq. It holds that either:
(a) A “ ptpu,H, pq; or
(b) A “ pG,R, pq and
i. for every g P G: there exists A 1 P SubpAq such that A 1 “ ptgu,H, gq and there exists r P R such
that r “ p1, . . . , g, . . . , pn ù p 1; and
ii. for every r 1 P R such that r 1 “ p1, . . . , pm ù p2: there exists A2 P SubpAq such that A2 “
pG2, R2 Y tr 1u, p2q.
Proof: Definition 4 includes three clauses that define when A “ pG,R, pq is an argument. In the first clause,
the base case of the recursive definition, p P K, R is empty and G “ tpu, satisfying case (a).
The rest of this proof concerns case (b). Now, the second and third clauses of Definition 4, which define
the recursive step of the definition, tells us that pG,R, pq is an argument if there exists a rule r P R such
that r “ p1, . . . , pn ù p and for each pi p1 ď i ď nq there exists an argument Ai P ApAT q such that
ConcpAiq “ pi. In other words, for every premise pi of the rule r there is a sub-argument Ai of A whose
conclusion is that premise. Unwinding each of those sub-arguments in turn, they are either of the form
ptpiu,H, piq, or can be deconstructed into a rule with sub-arguments for each premise, where that rule is in
R. In the first of these cases, the first clause of Definition 4 tells us that pi P G, and so case (b.i) holds. From
the second of these cases we can infer that for every rule p1, . . . , pm ù p
2 P R, there is a sub-argument
pG2, R2 Y tp1, . . . , pm ù p2u, p2q of A, and case (b.ii) is proved. l
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In other words, given an argument A “ pG,R, pq, Proposition 1 states that every element of the grounds G
and the rules R is part of the derivation of p. However, as the following example shows, Definition 4 does
not imply that for any argument pG,R, pq there is no argument pG 1, R 1, pq such that G 1 Ă G and R 1 Ă R:
Example 3 Consider that we have an argumentation system AS1 “ xL, ,R1, ny, where L “ tp, q, r, s, t,
 p, q, r, s, tu and R1 “ tp, q ù s; s ù q;q, r ù tu. By adding the knowledge base K1 “ tp, q, ru
we obtain the argumentation theory AT1 “ xAS1,K1y, from which we can construct the following arguments:
A1 “ rps;A2 “ rqs;A3 “ rA1, A2 ù ss;A4 “ rA3 ù qs;A5 “ rrs;A “ rA4, A5 ù ts;
B “ rA2, A5 ù ts
such that A “ ptp, q, ru, tp, q ù s; s ù q;q, r ù tu, tq and B “ ptq, ru, tq, r ù tu, tq. Here, it is clear
that the grounds and rules of B are a subset of those of A.
Consider now the set of rules R2 “ tp, q ù r; r ù s; s ù t; t ù ru. We can obtain a new argumen-
tation system AS2 “ xL, ,R2, ny and combine it with the knowledge base K1 to obtain the argumentation
theory AT2 “ xAS2,K1y, from which we can construct the arguments:
C1 “ rps;C2 “ rqs;C3 “ rC1, C2 ù rs;C4 “ rC3 ù ss;C5 “ rC4 ù ts;C “ rC5 ù rs;
D “ C3 “ rC1, C2 ù rs
Here, C “ ptp, qu, tp, q ù r; r ù s; s ù t; t ù ru, rq and D “ ptp, qu, tp, q ù ruq and thus, RulespDq
is a subset of RulespCq.
Finally, if we consider a set of rules R3 “ tp ù r; r ù s;q ù r; r, s ù tu and a knowledge
base K3 “ tp, qu we can define an argumentation system AS3 “ xL, ,R3, ny and an argumentation theory
AT3 “ xAS3,K3y, from which we obtain:
E1 “ rps;E2 “ rE1 ù rs;E3 “ rE2 ù ss;E4 “ rqs;E5 “ rE4 ù rs;E “ rE5, E3 ù ts;
F “ rE2, E3 ù ts
In this case, E “ ptp, qu, tp ù r; r ù s;q ù r; r, s ù tu, tq and F “ ptpu, tp ù r; r ù s; r, s ù tu, tq.
As a result, the grounds and rules of F are a subset of those of E.
At first sight, this seems a bit contradictory. Example 2 and Proposition 1 show that arguments only
contain elements that are used in the derivation of their conclusion, yet Example 3 shows that elements can
be removed from the grounds or the rules of an argument, and what remains is still an argument. There is,
however, no contradiction. Rather, there are two ways in which this phnomenon might arise. The first is
illustrated by the first two cases in Example 3. Here we have arguments that are circular1 — if you follow
the chain of reasoning from premises to conclusion in A in the above example, we start with q, then derive
q, then use q to derive the final conclusion; similarly, when considering C, we start with p and q to derive
r, then derive s and t to derive (again) r. In B and D these loops are removed to give us more compact
arguments with the same conclusions. The second way in which this phenomenon might arise is illustrated
by the third case in Example 3, where we have arguments that are redundant. Here the cause is the fact
that the set of rules provides two ways to derive r, one that relies on p and another that relies on q, and r
appears twice in the derivation of t, once to produce s, and once when the rule r, s ù t is applied. E, the
redundant argument, uses both of the rules for deriving r while F uses just one of them, again providing a
more compact derivation.
Furthermore, as shown by the following example, circularity in arguments may lead to having two distinct
arguments A and B such that their descriptions pG,R, pq coincide. Hence, while we can extract a unique
description pG,R, pq from a given aspic` argument A, the reverse is not true.2
1We use the term “circular” to reflect the idea of circular reasoning [15] and “begging the question” [14].
2This is a version of the issue pointed out by [4, p119], that any inference-based description of an argument allows multiple
arguments to be described in the same way. In fact what we have here is a stronger version of the problem, because [4] pointed
out the problem for arguments which, in our terms, were described just by their grounds and conclusion. What we have here
is the problem arising even when we state the inference rules as well. This issue the is converse of the problem that describing
arguments by their entire structure, as aspic` and the assumption-based argumentation of [4] do, allows for redundant elements
in the arguments, as we have just shown.
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Example 4 Consider that we have an argumentation system AS “ xL, ,R, ny, where L “ ta, b, c, a, b, cu
and R “ ta ù c; c ù b;b ù au. We then add the knowledge base K “ tau to get the argumentation
theory AT “ xAS,Ky. From this we can construct the following arguments:
A1 “ ras; A2 “ rA1 ù cs; A3 “ rA2 ù bs; A “ rA3 ù as;
B1 “ rA ù cs; B2 “ rB1 ù bs; B “ rB2 ù as
Here, both arguments A and B are described by the triple pG,R, aq, where G “ PrempAq “ PrempBq “ tau,
R “ RulespAq “ RulespBq “ R and a “ ConcpAq “ ConcpBq.
Given the preceding analysis we can note that, even though the characterization of aspic`arguments
accounts for some form of minimality (see [8]), it allows for circular and redundant arguments. These notions
of circularity and redundancy are formalized next.
Definition 6 Let AT be an argumentation theory and A P ApAT q. We say that A is a circular argument if
DA1, A2 P SubpAq such that A1 ‰ A2, ConcpA1q “ ConcpA2q and A1 P SubpA2q.
Note that the usual definition of a circular argument in the literature [14, 15] involves starting with some
premise and then inferring that premise — a typical pattern is “Assume a, then a is true”. What we define
here as circular is more general.
Example 5 Considering Example 3 in the light of Definition 6 and looking at A, the two sub-arguments
that define its circularity are A1 “ ptqu,H, qq and A4 “ ptp, qu, tp, q ù s, s ù qu, qq. Then, if we
consider argument C, the two sub-arguments that define its circularity are C3 “ ptp, qu, tp, q ù ru, rq and
C “ ptp, qu, tp, q ù r, r ù s, s ù t, t ù ru, rq. Here, A follows the classic form of a circular argument.
In contrast, C illustrates a form of circularity not related to the premises of the argument.
Next, we formalize the notion of redundancy:
Definition 7 Let AT be an argumentation theory and A P ApATq. We say that A is a redundant argument
if DA1, A2 P SubpAq such that A1 ‰ A2, ConcpA1q “ ConcpA2q, A1 R SubpA2q and A2 R SubpA1q.
Example 6 Considering Example 3 in the light of Definition 7, the two sub-arguments that define the
redundancy of E are E2 “ ptpu, tp ù ru, rq and E5 “ ptqu, tq ù ru, rq.
We say that arguments that are non-circular and non-redundant are regular arguments since they are the
kinds of argument that one encounters most often in the literature. Clearly this is the same as saying:
Definition 8 Let AT be an argumentation theory and A P ApATq. We say that A is regular if EA1, A2 P
SubpAq such that A1 ‰ A2 and ConcpA1q “ ConcpA2q.
Now, to tie this back to the other notion of minimality, that of a minimal set of information from which
a conclusion is derived, we need a notion of inference that works for aspic`. We start with a notion of
closure. Given an argumentation theory, we can define the closure of a set of propositions in the knowledge
base under a set of rules of the theory.
Definition 9 Let AT “ xAS,Ky be an argumentation theory, where AS is the argumentation system AS “
xL, ,R, ny. We define the closure of a set of propositions P Ď K under a set of rules R Ď R as ClpPqR,
where:
1. P Ď ClpPqR;
2. if p1, . . . , pn P ClpPqR and p1, . . . , pn ù p P R, then p P ClpPqR; and
3. ES Ă ClpPq such that S satisfies the previous conditions.
Based on the notion of closure, we can define a notion of inference from a set of propositions and rules of an
argumentation theory.
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Definition 10 Let AT “ xAS,Ky be an argumentation theory, where AS is the argumentation system AS “
xL, ,R, ny. Given a set of propositions P Ď K, a set of rules R Ď R and a proposition p P K, we say that p
is inferred from P and R, noted as P $R p, if p P ClpPqR.
Now, with this notion of inference, we can characterize minimal arguments. These arguments are such that
they have minimal (with respect to Ď) sets of grounds and rules that allow to infer their conclusion.
Definition 11 Let AT “ xAS,Ky be an argumentation theory and A P ApATq. We say that A “ pG,R, pq
is a minimal argument if EG 1 Ă G such that G 1 $R p and ER 1 Ă R such that G $R 1 p.
The following example illustrates the first condition in Definition 11.
Example 7 Let AT “ xAS,Ky be an argumentation theory, where AS “ xL, ,R, ny, R “ td ù b;b ù c;
b, c ù au and K “ tb, du. From AT we can construct the following arguments:
A1 “ rds;A2 “ rA1 ù bs;A3 “ rA2 ù cs;A4 “ rbs;A “ rA4, A3 ù as;
B “ rA2, A3 ù as;
A5 “ rA4 ù cs;C “ rA4, A5 ù as
Here, A “ pG,R, aq, with G “ tb, du and R “ R. In this case, A is not minimal since DG 1 Ă G, with
G 1 “ tdu, such that G 1 $R a; moreover, B “ pG 1, R, aq. On the other hand, argument C is represented by
the triple pG2, R 1, aq, with G2 “ tbu and R 1 “ tb ù c;b, c ù au. In particular, argument C is minimal.
Furthermore, B is also minimal since, even though R 1 Ă R, it is not the case that G 1 $R 1 a.
It should be noted that, since the notion of minimality characterized in Definition 11 explicitly accounts
for the set of grounds of the arguments, this notion of minimality is different from those used in structured
argumentation systems such as DeLP [5]. Arguments in DeLP do not include the grounds: they are specified
by a pair pc, ∆q, where ∆ is the set of rules used to derive the conclusion c. Then, the notion minimality
in DeLP regards only the set of rules of the arguments. As a result, if we consider the arguments given in
Example 7, argument B would not be minimal in DeLP.
To illustrate the second condition of Definition 11, let us consider the situation depicted in Example 4.
There we have arguments A and B, which are both described by the triple pG,R, aq, with G “ tau and
R “ ta ù c; c ù b;b ù au. Also, there is argument A1 “ pG 1,H, aq, with G 1 “ tau. As a result,
DG 1 Ă G such that G 1 $R a and therefore, arguments A and B are not minimal, in contrast with A1.
Given the characterization of regular and minimal arguments, the following proposition shows that these
notions are equivalent.
Proposition 2 Let AT “ xAS,Ky be an argumentation theory and A “ pG,R, pq P ApAT q. A is a regular
argument iff A is a minimal argument.
Proof: The proof follows the same form as that of Proposition 1, being based around the three clauses of
Definition 4.
Let us start with the if part. In the first clause of Definition 4, p is a proposition in K, R is empty, and
G contains just p. Clearly, in this case there is no R 1 Ă R, or G 1 Ă G such that G 1 $R p or G $R 1 p, so A
is minimal. It is also regular. The second and third clauses in Definition 4 define the recursive case. Here,
A “ pG,R, pq is an argument if p is the conclusion of a rule, let us call it r and there is an argument in
ApAT q for each of the premises of r. G is then the union of the grounds of all the arguments with conclusions
that are premises of r, we will call this set of arguments Args, and R is the union of all the rules for Args,
call them Rs, plus r. If all the arguments in Args are minimal, then A will be minimal, so long as piq
adding r does not introduce any non-minimality, and piiq the union of the grounds and the rules of the
arguments in Args do not introduce any non-minimality. Let us consider case piq. For the addition of r
to introduce non-minimality, it must be the case that pG,Rs, pq is an argument. In this case, pG,Rs, pq
will be a sub-argument of A and thus, by Definition 6 A is circular, contradicting the hypothesis that it is
a regular argument. Let us now consider case piiq. Here, in order for A not to be minimal, there have
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to be minimal arguments pG1, R1, p1q, . . . , pGn, Rn, pnq in Args such that p1, . . . , pn are the premises in r
and A “ p
Ťn
i“1Gi,
Ťn
i“1 Ri Y tru, pq is not minimal. Because we are taking the unions, no duplication can
be introduced. Since G1, . . . , Gn are just sets of propositions, their union cannot be the cause of any non-
minimality, and we know from case piq that any non-minimality is not due to r. So if any non-minimality
is introduced, it is in
Ťn
i“1 Ri. Since Proposition 1 tells us that every rule in Ri must be used in deriving pi,
the only way that
Ťn
i“1 Ri can make A non-minimal is if there is some rule in Rj which allows the derivation
of the same conclusion as a rule in Rk pwith 1 ď j, k ď n, and j ‰ k). If this is the case, A “ pG,R, pq would
have two distinct sub-arguments with the same conclusion, where one is not a sub-argument of the other,
and hence, by Definition 7 be redundant, contradicting the hypothesis that A is regular.
Let us now address the only if part. In the first clause of Definition 4, p is a proposition in K, R is empty,
and G contains just p. Clearly, in this case A is regular since A is the only sub-argument of A; thus, there
exist no distinct sub-arguments of A with the same conclusion. A is also minimal. The second and third
clauses in Definition 4 define the recursive case. Here, A “ pG,R, pq is an argument if p is the conclusion
of a rule, let us call it r and there is an argument in ApATq for each of the premises of r. G is then the
union of the grounds of all the arguments with conclusions that are premises of r, and R is the union of
all the rules for those arguments, plus r. Since by hypothesis A “ pG,R, pq is minimal, it must be the case
that EG 1 Ă G such that G 1 $R p and ER 1 Ă R such that G $R 1 p. Suppose by contradiction that A is not
regular. Hence, there should exist two distinct sub-arguments A1 “ pG1, R1, p 1q and A2 “ pG2, R2, p 1q of A
such that G1 ‰ G2, R1 ‰ R2 or both. However, this would imply that DG 1 Ă G pwith G 1 “ pGzG1q Y G2 or
G 1 “ pGzG2qYG1q or DR 1 Ă R pwith R 1 “ pRzR1qYR2 or R 1 “ pRzR2qYR1q such that G 1 $R p and ER 1 Ă R
such that G $R 1 p, contradicting the hypothesis that A is minimal. l
The following example illustrates the relationship between regular and minimal arguments.
Example 8 Let us consider the arguments from Example 7, where it was shown that B and C are minimal
arguments, whereas A is not. Here, we have that B is also regular, since it has no pair of sub-arguments with
the same conclusion. Specifically, SubpBq “ tB,A2, A3, A1u, and ConcpBq “ a, ConcpA2q “ b, ConcpA3q “ c,
ConcpA1q “ d. Similarly, C is also regular since SubpCq “ tC,A4, A5u, where ConcpCq “ a, ConcpA4q “ b
and ConcpA5q “ c. In contrast, if we consider argument A, which was shown to be non-minimal in Example 7,
we have SubpAq “ tA,A4, A3, A2, A1u where, in particular, ConcpA4q “ b and ConcpA2q “ b; therefore, A
is not a regular argument.
On the other hand, if we consider the arguments from Example 3, it was shown in Examples 5 and 6 that
A, C and E are not regular arguments (the first two by being circular and the last one by being redundant).
Then, if we look at the minimality of these arguments, we have that A “ pGa, Ra, tq, with Ga “ tp, q, ru,
Ra “ tp, q ù s; s ù q;q, r ù tu, and DG 1a “ tru, DR
1
a “ tr ù tu such that G
1
a $Ra t and Ga $R 1a
t; hence, A is not a minimal argument. In the case of C “ pGc, Rc, rq, with Gc “ tp, qu and Rc “
tp, q ù r; r ù s; s ù t; t ù ru, we have that DR 1c “ tp, q ù ru such that Gc $R 1c r and therefore, C is
not minimal. Finally, given E “ pGe, Re, tq, with Ge “ tp, qu and Re “ tp ù r; r ù s;q ù r; r, s ù tu,
it is the case that DG 1e “ tpu, DG
2
e “ tqu, DR
1
e “ tp ù r; r ù s; r, s ù tu, DR
2
e “ tr ù s;q ù r; r, s ù
tu such that G 1e $Re t, G
2
e $Re t, Ge $R 1e t and Ge $R2e t; thus, E is not a minimal argument.
Let us consider another example regarding minimal and non-minimal arguments.
Example 9 Consider that we have an argumentation system AS9 “ xL9, ,R9, ny, where L9 “ tp, q, r, p,
 q, ru and R9 “ tp ù q;q ù ru. By adding the knowledge base K9 “ tp, qu we obtain the argumenta-
tion theory AT9 “ xAS9,K9y, from which we can construct the following arguments:
H1 “ rps; H2 “ rH1 ù qs; H “ rH2 ù rs;
I1 “ rqs; I “ rI1 ù rs
such that H “ ptpu, tp ù q;q ù ru, rq and I “ ptqu, tq ù ru, rq.
Even though arguments H and I in Example 9 have the same conclusion and use the same rule to draw that
conclusion, they are both minimal. This is because an argument is minimal according to Definition 11 if
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there is no argument for the same conclusion with a smaller set of both premises (grounds) and rules. Thus
it is possible to have two minimal arguments for the same conclusion, one of which uses a subset of the rules
that the other does, so long as the premises are disjoint. Similarly, we could have two minimal arguments
for the same conclusion, one of which uses a subset of the premises that the other does, so long as the rules
are disjoint.
On the other hand, the situation depicted in Example 9 relates to the one involving arguments C3 “
ptp, qu, tp, q ù ru, rq and C “ ptp, qu, tp, q ù r; r ù s; s ù t; t ù ru, rq in Example 3. However,
even though C3 and C have the same conclusion, differently from H and I, they are such that one is a
sub-argument of the other (specifically, C3 is a sub-argument of C) and, as a result, C is not regular nor
minimal.
Finally, it should be noted that, since aspic` arguments are not required to be minimal in the sense of
Definition 11, it can be the case that two different arguments A and B have the same description as a triple
pG,R, pq, as occurred in Example 4. However, as shown by the following proposition, that cannot be the
case when considering minimal arguments.
Proposition 3 Let AT “ xAS,Ky be an argumentation theory and A “ pG,R, pq P ApAT q. If A is a
minimal argument, then EB P ApTq such that B ‰ A and B “ pG,R, pq.
Proof: Suppose that A “ pG,R, pq is a minimal argument and DB P ApTq such that B ‰ A and B “ pG,R, pq.
By Proposition 1, every element in the grounds G and every rule in R is used in the derivation of A’s and B’s
conclusion p. Furthermore, since by hypothesis A is minimal, by Definition 11 it is the case that EG 1 Ă G,
ER 1 Ă R such that G 1 $R p or G $R 1 p. If B ‰ A, then it must be the case that the difference between them
is on the number of times they use the rules in R. Since by hypothesis A is minimal, there must be a rule
r “ c1, . . . , cn ù c P R that is used more times in B than in A. Now consider the derivation of A and B.
From what we have said so far, these must be largely the same, so we can think of them starting from the
same set of premises and applying rules, one by one. Thinking of the two arguments like this, side by side,
so to speak, since B uses some r more than A, then at some stage B uses the rule r to derive c, whereas r
is not used in A at that point. Hence, since c is needed at that point to derive A’s conclusion p, there must
be an alternative derivation for c in A, which does not require the use of r. However, this would imply that
there exists a rule r 1 P R such that r 1 “ c 11, . . . , c
1
m ù c or c P G, contradicting the hypothesis that A is
minimal. As a result, if A is a minimal argument, then EB P ApTq such that B ‰ A and B “ pG,R, pq. l
We end by noting that even though H and I, above, are both minimal in the sense of Definition 11, I is
in some sense “more minimal” than G since the sets of premises of both arguments are the same size, while
I has a smaller set of rules. This suggests that further forms of minimality may be worth investigating.
4 Conclusion
In this report we have studied the notion of minimality of arguments in the context of aspic`. We have
considered two forms of minimality. The former corresponds to the native minimality of aspic`, which
implies that arguments do not include irrelevant grounds or rules. We have noted that, under the native
form of minimality, redundant and circular arguments may be obtained. Although there is nothing inherently
wrong with circular and redundant arguments, in some cases it may be helpful to work with arguments that
satisfy a stronger form of minimality. A stronger form of minimality is satisfied by what we have identified
as regular arguments, since these are the arguments that one encounters most often in the literature of
argumentation. Specifically, regular arguments make use of a minimal set of grounds and rules when deriving
their conclusion. It should be noted that an argument A satisfying the stronger form of minimality uses the
same grounds and rules for deriving a proposition c at every step in which c is required in the derivation
of A’s conclusion. Furthermore, we have shown that regular arguments, satisfying the stronger form of
minimality, can be unequivocally described by a triple pG,R, pq, distinguishing their grounds, rules and
conclusion. In contrast, that is not the case for arguments complying only with aspic`’s native form of
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minimality. Finally, in the future we are interested in studying the relationship between the strong form of
minimality characterized here and that considered in other structured argumentation systems.
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